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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK, a national 
association, 
Defendant & Third-Party: 
Respondent, 
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON and 
KATHLEEN JOHNSON, his 
wife; GLENDON E. JOHNSON 
and BOBETTE JOHNSON, his 
wife; CLIFTON I. JOHNSON;: 
JOHNSON LAND COMPANY, a 
partnership; and BAR 70 
RANCHES, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Third-Party & 
Additional Party 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
No. 17187 
This is an action to compel Zions First National Bank 
to Reconvey a Trust Deed on unimproved land in Grand County, 
Utah, and to permanently enjoin the bank from proceeding 
with a Trustee's Sale under the terms of the aforesaid 
Trust Deed. 
Title Insurance Agency of Utah, acting as agent for 
Plaintiff and Appellant, United American Life, paid to Zions 
First National Bank the sum of $50,000, for a Reconveyance 
J 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of a Trust Deed on the above lands in Grand County, Utah. 
The payment was made by Title Insurance Agency's voucher-
check which contained the following legend: 
Payment in full of Trust Deed 
dated November 19, 1968, 
executed by Bar 70 Ranches, 
Inc., recorded November 20, 
1968, as Entry No._,--=-~-:-o,...,,.-~ 
in Book 170, pages 190-200. 
No prior contractual duty or privity had ever existed 
between Zions First National Bank and United American Life. 
The check was accepted and retained by the bank, however, 
it refused and now refuses to execute and record a proper 
Reconveyance. 
Zions First National Bank, Respondent herein, denies 
that it, in any way, agreed to a Reconveyance and further 
denies that the facts and circumstances of the case give 
rise to any duty on its part to Reconvey. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a court sitting without a jury. 
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment against Plaintiff and Appellant and in favor 
of Defendant and Respondent. The court further found and 
adjudged, that in the event Plaintiff paid the amount of the 
lien, it was granted Judgment against the additional parties 
to the extent of the amount of the payment. 
A Motion to Amend the Findings and Conclusions and to 
enter a new or different Judgment was, in most particulars, 
denied by the court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment in favor of 
Zions First National Bank and asks that Judgment be entered 
in its favor ordering a Reconveyance of the real property 
described in the Trust Deed; for a permanent Injunction 
restraining the bank from further attempts to foreclose its 
Trust Deed; and for attorney's fees. 
-3-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The sequence of events giving rise to this litigation 
began November 18, 1968. Mr. Wayne Hintze, Vice-President 
and Manager of the Mortgage Loan Department of Zions First 
National Bank, made a loan to Johnson Land Company, a 
partnership composed of Clifton I. Johnson, Glendon E. 
Johnson and Franklin D. Johnson and Bar 70 Ranches, a 
Nevada corporation, and to Clifton I. Johnson, Franklin o. 
Johnson and Glendon E. Johnson, individually. A Trust Deed 
Note for $150,000.00, with interest at ten (10%) percent 
per annum, was executed by the foregoing parties. (Ex. 3). 
To secure this Note, Bar 7 0 Ranches gave a Trust Deed (Ex. 41 
on approximately 1100 acres of unimproved land on the Green 
River in Grand County, Utah, approximately six miles south 
of Green River, Utah. (See Plat Ex. 1). 
Mr. Hintze was well acquainted with Franklin Johnson, 
having known him for many years, "since he was a tow-headed 
boy". (Tr. 149). 
Almost from its inception, the loan was a prob lern loan. 
Payments were not made when due and demands for payment and 
collection efforts were continuous. There were never any 
principal payments made until 1974, when Appellant entered 
the picture. Interest payments, however, had been made, b~ 
not on a timely basis. 
By 1973, Mr. Hintze and other bank personnel were writi: 
letters tb Mr. Johnson demanding payment. (Ex. 33-36-61) · 
These demands and negotiations resulted in the preparation:· 
-4-
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an Extension and Modification Agreement dated April 17, 
1973. (Ex. 31). Evidently, that Agreement was not put 
into effect and a new Extension and Modification Agreement 
was entered into between the bank and the Johnson interests 
in August, 1973. (Ex. 35). The Extension Agreement called 
for the payment of $75,000, on or before October 1, 1973. 
This payment was not made and on October 25, 1973, Mr. Hintze 
wrote to Franklin Johnson demanding the payment. (Ex. 36). 
On October 30, 1973, Mr. Franklin Johnson replied by letter 
stating he would need until December 7, 1973, to pay the 
$75,000. (Ex. 37). This request was reluctantly agreed to 
by Mr. Hintze by letter dated November 24, 1973. (Ex. 39). 
During the year 1973, Mr. Johnson was making a very 
determined effort either to sell property that he and his 
brothers owned or to refinance obligations owing on the 
property, including the indebtedness to Zions First National 
Bank, to put their financial situation in a more positive 
posture. To this end, he had arranged to undertake new and 
additional financing with Appellant United American Life. 
This involved restructuring a loan on properties in Ogden, 
Utah, in the amount of $675,000, and an additional loan of 
$185,000, on property involved in this lawsuit and property 
located in Sanpete County, Utah, and in the State of Colorado. 
The details of the transaction are set forth in Exhibit 45. 
This is a letter to Mr. Alton Lund, President of Title 
Insurance Agency of Utah, from United American Life containing 
instructions on how to handle the new financing package. The 
:11 
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Exhibit contains the following statement: 
your Title Insurance Binder 
Order No. 33743 which indicates, 
among other things, that there is 
a lien due the Zions First National 
Bank in the amount of one hundred 
and fifty thousand dollars. It is 
understood that this lien may be 
released upon payment of fifty 
thousand dollars to the Zions First 
National Bank. 
Prior to the financing arrangement obtained by Frankl~ 
Johnson from Appellant, he had visited with Mr. Hintze and 
discussed his financial situation in detail. Mr. Hintze 
was well aware of his plight and was anxious to help if 
possible. (Tr. 149). 
The understanding that Appellant relied upon relative 
to the payment of $50,000 to obtain a release of the lien 
of Zions First National Bank, came from Franklin Johnson 
and his understanding came about as a result of discussions 
and negotiations he had with Mr. Wayne Hintze. 
These negotiations are extremely important and will be 
discussed in detail at this point. 
A meeting was held between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hintze 
during the first part of December, 1973. Mr. Johnson testi· 
fied as follows concerning that meeting: 
Q. Mr. Johnson, you filed an affidavit 
in this action, and I ask you to 
read paragraph 8 of that and then 
read it out loud if you will. 
A. Yes. I'll read the paragraph 8: 
"Over a period of some consider-
able time Affiant and Mr. Wayne 
Hintze had numerous discussions 
concerning the satisfaction of the 
promissory note. I informed Mr. 
-6-
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Hintze that it would not be possible 
to pay the note without securing 
new and additional financing, 
and that the party that we were 
negotiating with namely United 
American Life would require a 
first lien against the real 
property. After considerable 
discussion on the matter, Mr. Hintze 
on behalf of the bank in substance 
and effect stated that if we would 
pay $50,000 on the principal of the 
obligation the bank would release 
its trust deed." 
Q. And when was that affidavit signed? 
A. 15th day of June, 1978. 
Q. And was that a true statement when 
it was made? 
A. Yes. I think there is one error. 
I think that the agreement was 
$75,000 rather than $50,000. 
Q. All right. Now, you were not 
asking Mr. Hintze to cancel the 
note for that amount of money, 
namely the $75,000; is that 
correct? 
A. No. What we were trying to do 
was refinance the note and in 
effect make it a personal note. 
Q. All right. What you were asking 
for was a release of the lien that 
they had on the ranch property in 
Green River? 
A. Yes. 
Q. For their payment. And you indicate 
that you had an agreement with Mr. 
Hintze to that effect; is that right? 
A. Yes. I felt that we did, (Tr. 27). 
The testimony of Mr. Hintze: 
Q. Can you recall any more of the 
specific details about this 
meeting with Frank Johnson on 
December 10th of '73? 
A. We were very anxious to assist 
Frank any way we could in getting 
this obligation taken care of. He 
-7-
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did indicate it was important to 
have this property released. And 
he then proposed that he could pay 
$75,000 now and that he would 
arrange the other $75,000 just as 
the memo said, through the commer-
cial loan department. And when we 
got that money then we would be --
then we would release the mortgage, 
which would be a total payment of 
$150,000. 
Q. Did you tell him that you would 
do anything to assist him in 
arranging for a loan of $75,000 
that was unsecured with the 
commercial loan department? 
A. No, I did not. I suggested 
that -- to Frank that he make 
that arrangement as soon as 
possible, because he knew Mr. 
Lang and Mr. Langdon and Mr. 
Bennett and after -- later 
that afternoon I did go down 
and talk to Mr. Bennett and 
request that he see Frank when 
he comes in, if there was any 
way that he could make the loan, 
it would be very helpful to 
Frank. (Tr. 134-135). 
The testimony of Mr. Johnson says, in effect, that 
he had an agreement with the bank to release the lien for 
the payment of $75,000 and to proceed with the remainder 
of the loan on an unsecured basis with Mr. Hintze and 
Mr. Hintze's department. 
Mr. Hintze, on the other hand, says that no agreement 
was reached but he does acknowledge that it was necessary 
that Johnson have the lien released to secure the refinance 
package; that the promised payment of $75,000 was discuss~; 
and that, in fact, Mr. Hintze did talk to the Commercial Loan 
Department and told them that it would be very helpful ~o 
Mr. Johnson if the loan could be made. 
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The ambiguity or discrepancy in the testimony of both 
parties relates only to the manner in which the balance of 
the loan would be handled. Mr. Johnson was under the impres-
sion that Mr. Hintze would handle it in his department as an 
unsecured loan and Mr. Hintze was under the impression that 
Mr. Johnson would apply to the Commercial Loan Department of 
the bank for an unsecured loan. The $75,000 payment was, 
in fact, made but a new unsecured Note was never signed. 
Of course, it would not have made sense to sign a new Note 
until the $75,000 was actually paid and this was done at 
a later date. 
The attention of the court is now directed to the 
activities of the third-parties in this transaction. As 
indicated, United American Life agreed to the refinancing 
package and forwarded to Title Insurance Agency of Utah the 
sum of $155,931.81 with instructions for disbursement. (Ex. 45). 
One of the instructions was to obtain a release of the 
lien to Zions First National Bank and record a new first lien 
in favor of Appellant. Mr. Reece Howell, an officer of Title 
Insurance Agency of Utah and an attorney, testified as to the 
mechanics of the closing with particular regard to the handling 
of the Zions' lien. Mr. Howell testified that his company had 
transacted a large amount of title business with Zions and that 
a custom existed between the two companies, whereby the Title 
Company would call the Loan Officer for a release figure on a 
particular secured loan; obtain the figure and then forward 
the payment check without immediately receiving the required 
-9-
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and expected Release of Mortgage or Reconveyance. After 
the bank had cleared their loan, and this would sometimes 
take several weeks or months, (Tr. 88), the Release or 
Reconveyance would be forwarded by the bank. 
Mr. Howell testified that he called the Mortgage 
Department of Zions First National Bank to verify the 
figures of this loan as he did in the case of every trans-
action he had ever closed. On this point his testimony on 
cross-examination was clear and unequivocal. (Tr. 103). 
Subsequent to obtaining verification of figures, Mr. 
Howell prepared a check and voucher for delivery to Zions 
First National Bank. The check and voucher are reproduced 
at this point in the Brief for ease of reference . 
.:11. ·- DESCRIPTION_--- .... _-'- .. ._.- ... .'- _ ... ,-:c:. .. ;-.:..:,._ :=-- 1-.-- I-'' -
P~~~n~·~iii: f~ll ~f Trust 'Deed dated Nove'mbe~ i-9, ,196~~·-:i ~'~ ~: .,- ·'.~ :;. i_' 
:ex.ecuted by ~Bar JO Ranches, : Inc. recorde'd. November:·,:.·;:}:::- 1',·::, _. : -::::::_~-
.: -·20,.-1968,: as :Entry.No.· -, in· Book 170,_-_pages_:::_c:.-.'. -- · - -
198-200.- ,.,,-_ . . - . - -
-=-,' ._~-. 
Our Order No. __ 33743 ' - '. -.·:• 
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Mr. George Robinson of Title Insurance Agency delivered 
the check and voucher directly to the office of Mr. Wayne 
Hintze at Zions First National Bank. 
Mr. Hintze admitted receipt of the check and voucher, 
but his testimony concerning the handling of that item is 
vague and equivocal: 
Q. All right. Let's follow it 
just one step further. You 
did actually have in your 
possession this check, Exhibit 
75, before it was cashed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was the voucher attached? 
A. I cannot swear to that. When I 
saw the check it was like this 
and I did not turn it over. I 
was not concerned what was on 
the voucher because in my mind 
it was the conversation with 
Frank that he could pay $75,000, 
and that he would arrange for 
the other $75,000 through the 
commercial loan department. 
Now, I assumed that's what he 
was doing. And so the check 
was -- my instructions to the 
off ice was to hold this check 
until Frank brought in the rest 
of the money. 
Q. Where is a reference on that 
check to Frank Johnson? 
A. There is no reference to it. 
Q. Then how do you equate that 
with $50,000 coming from Frank 
Johnson? 
A. At the time it was given to me 
by a representative of the title 
insurance, either personally or 
given to my secretary in an en-
velooe from Title Insurance Agency, 
one ~r the other, which indicated 
on it a Bar 70 Ranch -- I'm not 
denying -- Unfortunately I have 
to admit that voucher was attached 
to the check, presumably because 
it was ~~ our loan file. It's 
-11- j 
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embarrassing to admit it was 
there. I've said I have no recol-
lection of that because I specif i-
cally do not remember reading that 
voucher on the check until after 
this lawsuit started. (Emphasis 
added.) (Tr. 153-154). 
How he knew the check from Title Insurance Agency 
referred to Bar 70 Ranches or Franklin Johnson is never 
satisfactorily explained. Mr. Hintze denies reading the 
voucher portion of the check until this litigation was 
commenced and yet knew at the time the check was received 
that it applied to the Bar 70 loan. It must be noted that 
only on the voucher is the name Bar 70 mentioned. This 
cannot be reconciled. Furthermore, Mr. Hintze testified 
that had he read the voucher at the time the check was 
received, he would have handed it back to the person who 
delivered it as unacceptable. (Tr. 156). What happened, 
however, is that Mr. Hintze gave the check to his office 
manager with instructions to hold it until Mr. Johnson 
brought in the balance of the money. (Tr. 156). 
Shortly thereafter, the bank cashed the check, reta~~ 
the proceeds and applied the amount to the Bar 70 Note. 
Mr. Hintze was also aware that a severe problem had 
been created for Title Insurance Agency of Utah sometime 
between January 25, 1974, and the date that the bank receivea 
the additional $25,000 from Mr. Johnson (June, 1974). Mr. 
Hintze had a conversation with Mr. Alton Lund the President 
of the Title Company. Mr. Hintze's testimony on this point 
follows: 
Q. When Mr. Lund spoke to you 
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concerning a release or a 
reconveyance of this trust 
deed, wasn't it apparent to 
you that he was looking to 
get that from you? 
A. Well, I'd have to say if I'd 
given it to him he would have 
been very happy; but I told 
him I couldn't give it to him 
because we had not received 
the money from Frank Johnson. 
Q. But had the $50,000 from his 
company just been a payment on 
account, there would have been 
no reason for him to question 
you about a release, would 
there? 
A. No. 
Q. So you knew -- you must have 
known there was a problem here 
by that time, did you not? 
A. I did. I would say yes. (Tr. 164). 
Nonetheless, the bank retained the $50,000 from 
Title Insurance Agency. (Tr. 165). 
Thereafter, Mr. Franklin Johnson paid the sum of 
$25,000 to the bank in June, 1974, and this represented 
the full $75,000 payment on the Note. There the matter 
remained until 1978, when the bank began foreclosure pro-
ceedings by private Trustee's Sale. This litigation 
resulted. 
To briefly summarize, a loan made by Zions First 
National Bank to Bar 70 Ranches in 1968, secured by 
unimproved acreage in Grand County, Utah, became delin-
quent almost from its inception; by 1973, the collection 
problem was acute. Franklin Johnson and his brothers, 
who were the owners and principals in Bar 70 Ranches, were 
unable to pay the Note and the likelihood of collection by 
-13-
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the bank was doubtful. Mr. Wayne Hintze, the bank officer 
who made the loan, was well acquainted with Franklin Johnson 
and had known of his financial problems for some years. He 
was anxious to help if possible. 
Mr. Johnson incurred and obtained new and additional 
financing and refinancing on various parcels of property in 
January, 1974. During that time, he had a meeting with Mr. 
Hintze and asked that Mr. Hintze accept $75,000 on the 
principal of the Bar 70 Note, release the Trust Deed and 
handle the balance on an unsecured basis. He felt that he 
had an agreement with Mr. Hintze when he left the meeting. 
Mr. Hintze denied an agreement, but his Memo to the file 
(Ex. 41) does not indicate a denial, but only that Mr. 
Johnson would apply to the Commercial Loan Department at 
the bank for an unsecured loan on the balance. These two 
principals apparently differ only on the question as to 
which department of the bank would handle the balance of 
the loan on an unsecured basis. 
Approximately 45 days after Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hintze 
met, a check representing the funds of United American Life, 
in the amount of $50,000, was delivered to Mr. Hintze by 
Title Insurance Agency of Utah, as United American Life's 
agent; the voucher on the check clearly and unmistakably 
spelled out the terms for its acceptance; namely, that it 
1 paid in full the Trust Deed given by Bar 70 Ranches. It 
1 It should be clearly understood that no one contends that 
the SS0,000 check paid the loan in full; only that it 
bought a Reconveyance of the Trust Deed. 
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is impossible to believe that Mr. Hintze failed to note the 
contents of the voucher; that is the only way he could have 
identified the transaction. Admitting that he would have 
returned the check had he read the voucher, he nonetheless 
held it, the bank cashed it; knowing that it created a 
critical problem for Title Insurance Agency and retained 
the money, never offering to return it. 
The evidence cited above is not unique in the field of 
commercial transactions involving financing arrangements and 
title insurance companies. The legal principles of accord 
and satisfaction; payment by a third-party; equitable 
estoppel; and conditional delivery of a check all have 
application to this factual situation and are interrelated. 
For clarity, the points will be discussed separately. 
Because of the similarity of the applicable rules, some 
repetition is unavoidable. 
-15-
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POINT I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING "ACCORD AND SATISFACTION". 
The acceptance by the bank of the $50,000 check and 
the additional $25,000 payment resulted in an accord and 
satisfaction, obligating the bank to Reconvey the Trust 
property. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has described an accord and 
satisfaction as "a method of discharging a contract, or 
settling a claim arising from a contract, by substituting 
for such agreement or claim an agreement for the satisfaction 
thereof, and the execution of the substituted agreement." 
Cannon vs. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah, 
1977). 
This court has on several occasions stated that there 
are four essential requirements for a valid accord and 
satisfaction: (1) proper subject matter, (2) competent 
parties, (3) an assent or meeting of the minds, and (4) a 
consideration given for the accord. Sugarhouse Finance 
Co. vs. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah, 1980), and Ralph 
A. Badger and Co. vs. Fidelity Building and Loan Associatioo, 
75 P.2d 669 (Utah, 1938). It is obvious that the subject 
matter, in this case a Trust Deed, is a proper subject 
matter for an accord and it is also obvious that the parties, 
namely Franklin Johnson, Zions First National Bank, Title 
Insurance Agency of Utah, and United American Life, are 
competent. Only the last two requirements, namely assent 
and consideration, require in-depth analysis. 
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A. Zions Bank assented to the accord. 
It is a traditional rule of law that in order for an 
accord and satisfaction to be enforceable, there must be 
an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties. 1 Am Jur 
2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Sec. 11, p. 309. In determining 
whether there has been an assent, the Utah Court looks at 
the total circumstances of a case. See Tate, Inc. vs. Little 
America Refining co., 535 P.2d 1228 (1977), and Hintze vs. 
Seaich, 20 Ut.2d 275, 437 P.2d 202 (1968). 
The circumstances of this case are easily stated. 
Franklin Johnson and his brothers, and the entities they 
controlled, owed the bank $150,000 which they could not pay. 
The bank had a doubtful loan on its hands. Neither party 
desi~ed to be in that position. For some as yet unexplained 
reason, Zions First National Bank chose to avoid and not to 
enforce, despite its availability as the most expedient and 
direct remedy, the power of sale available to it within the 
subject Deed of Trust. There is no evidence in the record 
that the security for the loan, namely the unimproved acreage 
in Grand County, Utah, was worth anywhere near the amount of 
the loan. A personal relationship existed between Mr. Hintze 
and Mr. Johnson going back many years. This would not only 
put a strain on that relationship, but it would also make it 
difficult to deal with the probiem. This would explain why 
the parties had somewhat different views of the meeting in 
December, 1973. There is no question that Mr. Johnson was 
offering tc pay $75,000 on the obligation in order to 
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restructure the loan from a secured loan to an unsecured 
loan. This required a Reconveyance of the property so as 
to place United American Life in a first lien priority 
position. This is acknowledged by Mr. Hintze. Mr. Johnson 
thought the remaining balance of the loan would then be 
handled on an unsecured basis. Mr. Hintze denied such 
understanding but his Memo to the file did indicate that 
the balance of the loan could be handled by the Commercial 
Loan Department. 
The negotiations between Mr. Hintze and Mr. Johnson 
created a mindset on the part of Mr. Hintze. Stated in 
traditional contract terms and given this background, the 
subsequent delivery of the $50,000 check and voucher, with 
its clear terms and conditions, was in fact and law an offer 
to Zions First National Bank. The banks retention of the 
check and proceeds and acquiescence in the terms thereof 
constituted Zions First National Banks acceptance and assent 
thereto. 
The $50,000 check and voucher was delivered to Mr. 
Hintze, the bank official in charge of the Mortgage Loan 
Department. He knew the check had been funded by United 
American Life Insurance Company, a third-party, and that 
pursuant to its terms and his past business experience, Unite: 
American Life required as a condition of the payment, Zions 
First National Bank's Reconveyanc e of its Deed of Trust. Mr. 
Hintze knew further that Title Insurance Agency of Utah, as 
agent for United American Life, expected and required a 
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Reconveyance and that the retention of the check and 
voucher without such a Reconveyance created a serious 
problem for Title Insurance Agency. Mr. Hintze, however, 
took no action, made no protest, did not offer to return 
the check and voucher nor even make inquiry or seek 
clarification, rather he accepted the check, acquiesced 
in its terms and retained the benefits to the detriment 
2 
of United American Life and Title Insurance Agency of Utah. 
The effect of Mr. Hintze's conduct as to the third-party, 
the Appellant, is clear. The bank cannot evade the binding 
effect of its assent in this case by claiming that it did 
not have knowledge of or would not be bound to the terms 
of the $50,000 check and voucher. 
In Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co. vs. Register and 
Tribune, 219 N.W. 321 (Iowa, 1928), the court held that if 
"through lack of attention or carelessness the creditor 
fails to understand the debtor's declaration that the check 
is sent in full discharge of an unliquidated claim, the 
2It should be noted that Zions First National Bank was not 
without any alternative. The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted 
in Utah, provided the appropriate recourse for Zions. U.C.A. 
Sec.70A-l-207 provides that the recipient of a payment does 
not assent to the terms or conditions under which a payment is 
offered nor prejudices his rights by acceptance thereof so 
long as the acceptance or endorsement is expressly made "under 
protest" or "without prejudice". Thus, even though the Utah 
legislature has adequately proscribed the conduct Zions should 
have taken and to avoid a de facto assent or acceptance of the 
terms and conditions of the check and voucher and to prevent 
United American Life and Title Insurance Agency of Utah from 
incurring any detrimental reliance, Mr. Hintze chose to ignore 
this common legislatively endorsed business practice. 
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acceptance by the creditor will be binding, even though 
the creditor neglects to read the conditions as stated in 
the letter or check". (219 N.W. at 323). Although this 
case dealt with an unliquidated claim, the conclusion of 
the court is inescapable: When a creditor receives a 
"payment in full" check, he has constructive notice as to 
the conditions written in the check. 
Legally charged with full notice and actual knowledge 
of the contents of the check and voucher, the bank cashed 
the check, retained the proceeds, and never offered any 
protest to the terms of the voucher nor offered to return 
the check. Such conduct on the part of the bank simply 
cannot be legally excused as being insignificant. The terms 
of the check and voucher have a compelling significance when 
viewed in the total circumstances of this case. 
In Bennett vs. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 417 P.2d 
761 (Utah, 1966), this court held that if a creditor, upon 
receipt of a check, discusses and disputes the amount of 
the check with debtor, there will be no assent to the accord 
even if the creditor cashes the check. 
Zions Bank remained silent on this matter, when a clear 
duty to protest arose if it did not accept the check accordinc 
to its terms. 
Consistent with its concept of accord and elemental 
requirement of assent, the Utah Supreme Court has discussed 
what terms are appropriate under facts similar to those of 
this case for purposes of finding such assent. 
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In a recent case, Cannon vs. Stevens School of 
Business, supra., the court noted the importance of words 
to the effect of "return if not correct" upon a voucher. 
This requisite language was on the voucher that was tendered 
to Zions. 
In Reliable Furniture Company vs. American Assurance Co., 
466 P.2d 368 (Utah), the court stated that one of the impor-
tant "factors to be considered" in determining whether there 
is an assent to the accord when a creditor cashes a check is 
whether the notation "payment in full" appears on the check. 
Such a notation was specifically typed on the voucher in this 
case. 
In the case of Hintze vs. Seaich, 20 Ut.2d 275, 437 
P.2d 202, this court adopted the following principle: 
Two forms of accord and satisfaction 
of unliquidated claims are to be dis-
covered in the books. One is where 
there is a true assent to the accep-
tance of a payment in compromise of 
a dispute, or in extinguishment of 
a liability uncertain in amount. 
[Citation omitted.] The other is 
where the tender of the payment has 
been coupled with a condition whereby 
the use of the money will be wrongful 
if the condition is ignored. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This principle should apply with equal, if not more compelling, 
effect to this case where, although the amount of debt is not 
disputed, the proposal contained on the check-voucher, as it 
impacts on United American Life, was to secure a release of 
the security. 
The bank received funds from United lu~erican Life 
amounting to $50,000, funds that it would not have received 
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but for the reliance of United American Life upon Zions 
First National Banks acceptance of the terms of the check-
voucher. The total circumstances of this case lead to the 
compelling conclusion that Zions Bank assented to, and 
agreed to, release its security pursuant to its acceptance 
of the terms of the check-voucher. Where a duty to speak 
was clearly present, the bank remained silent and by its 
silence gave its assent to, and acceptance of, the terms 
of the $50,000 check and voucher. 
B. The accord and satisfaction entered into by the 
parties was supported by adequate consideration. 
The trial court held that no consideration was given 
to Zions to require it to release the Trust Deed. (Cone 1 usio~. 
of Law #3, Tr. 142). However, the trial court's Findings of 
Fact do not support such conclusion. The evidence to the 
contrary is clear. 
It is an elementary rule that for an accord and 
satisfaction of a liquidated debt to be enforceable, it 
must be supported by consideration. 1 Arn Jur 2d, Accord 
and Satisfaction, Sec. 12. While the nature of the consider-
ation necessary to support the accord is not capable of precioe 
def ini ti on, our court, however, has laid down important guide· 
lines in regard to adequacy of consideration in such cases. 
In the recent case of Sugarhouse Finance Co. vs. Anderson, 6i': 
P.2d 1369, the court stated: 
No completely satisfactory and 
comprehensive definition of 
"consideration" has ever been 
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devised. It is generally agreed, 
however, that where a promise is 
supported by the incurrence on 
the part of the promisee, of a 
legal detriment in order to confer 
a benefit on the promisor, such is 
sufficient to serve as consideration, 
thereby rendering the promise 
legally enforceable. This is 
particularly so when an accord 
and satisfaction is involved, 
the modern trend among the 
courts being to uphold such 
agreements wherever possible. In 
such cases, consideration is often 
found in the obligor's agreement 
to alter the means or method of 
payment of the obligation initially 
owed, or to surrender the assertion 
of a legally enforceable right. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of that 
case, the court stated: 
It is to be noted that, in the 
present case, plaintiff held a 
judgment which had been outstand-
ing for more than two years. Pur-
suant to the parties' conversation 
of January 31, 1979, defendant 
agreed that, for a release of the 
judgment upon payment of a lesser 
agreed amount, he would negotiate 
a loan with a third party to enable 
him to pay off the SJbstitute obli-
gation immediately. A check was 
given for the agreed amount at the 
conclusion of that conversation, 
and authorization to cash it followed 
two days later. In effect, defendant 
had agreed to transfer the debt repre-
sented by plaintiff's judgment to a 
third party, thereby immediately 
satisfying the obligation owed to 
plaintiff. This was something 
defendant had no legal obligation 
to do; by law, plaintiff could only 
move by levy of execution against 
property already owned by the defendant -
- plaintiff could not legally require 
defendant to incur additional obliga-
tions to satisfy the judgment. By so 
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doing, defendant deliberately incurred 
the detriment of surrendering his right 
to limit plaintiff's ability to obtain 
satisfaction of the underlying judgment, 
and bestowed upon plaintiff the benefit 
of immediate payment by means of the 
incurrence of additional indebtedness. 
We hold such action to constitute 
sufficient consideration to support 
the accord negotiated by the parties. 
The parallel between the Sugarhouse Finance case and 
the case now before the court for decision is striking. 
Sugarhouse Finance had a judgment that had been out-
standing for two years. Zions Bank had a loan which had 
been continuously delinquent for a number of years. 
In the Sugarhouse case, the Defendant met with Mr. 
Neuman Petty to discuss an alternative to full payment of 
the judgment. Franklin Johnson met with Mr. Hintze of Zions 
Bank to discuss an alternative method of satisfying the Note. 
In the Sugarhouse case, the financial difficulties of 
Anderson were known and discussed at the meeting. In this 
case, Mr. Hintze knew of the financial difficulties that 
Franklin Johnson was encountering. 
In the Sugarhouse case, a settlement for a lesser 
amount than the total judgment was proposed and accepted. 
In this case, Franklin Johnson proposed an "agreement to 
alter the means or method of payment of the obligation 
initially owed". Although Mr. Hintze's assent to the 
proposal at that time may not have been clear, the later 
actions of the bank unequivocally supply the assent as 
discussed, supra. 
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In the Sugarhouse case, Anderson negotiated a loan 
with a third-party to fund payment of the substituted 
obligation. Franklin Johnson, in fact, incurred additional 
debt with United American Life. 
Additional consideration on the part of Mr. Johnson 
comes from the fact that he assumed greater personal 
liability to the bank in giving up his right to have the 
bank foreclose against Bar 70 Ranches and, perhaps thereby, 
eliminate any personal liability. This, because the bank 
may have realized the full amount of its indebtedness on 
Trustee's or Sheriff's Sale. 
The case of A. Ray Curtis Co., vs. Barnes, 554 P.2d 
212 (Utah) , adds two additional elements to the accord 
doctrine. In that case the court dealt with a situation 
where a surety on a corporate debt, after negotiations, 
delivered a check for an amount less than the liquidated 
amount which contained the following statement: "Endorsement 
of this check constitutes payment in full". The court held: 
This was not an accord and 
satisfaction situation, involv-
ing a disputed amount, but one 
where the plaintiff pressured 
defendant; agreed to settle for 
a lesser amount; received a 
check from defendant, read the 
endorsement, but did not notify 
defendant of any unacceptability, 
and cashed it. 
The court, in that case, did not require as an element 
of accord and satisfaction that there be new consideration 
fer settlement of a lesser amount on a liquidated debt. The 
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financial difficulty of the debtor apparently supplied that 
missing element. Again, the financial difficulties of the 
Johnsons are in parallel with the holding in the Curtis 
Company case. 
A second element introduced by the Curtis case is 
payment by a third-party. 
The doctrine as set forth in 1 Arn Jur 2d, Accord 
and Satisfaction, Sec. 46: 
One of the recognized exceptions 
to the rule that part payment is 
not consideration for the dis-
charge of an entire liquidated 
debt is where the part payment 
is made by or with the aid of a 
third person. Thus, an agree-
ment between a debtor and his 
creditor whereby the latter 
undertakes to accept from a 
stranger a reduced amount of 
money in full satisfaction of 
his debt, and payment of such 
amount is made by the third per-
son at the request of the debtor 
and received by the creditor, 
there is an accord and satisfac-
tion as the creditor receives a 
benefit in securing the payment 
by such third person; otherwise, 
due to the financial condition 
of the debtor, he may not have 
been able to secure payment of 
any part of the debt. 
This principle is acknowledged by the Utah case of 
Smoot vs. Checketts, 125 P. 412. It is also well articulatec 
in the Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 421: 
A payment or other performance 
by a third person, accepted by 
a creditor as full or partial 
satisfaction of his claim, dis-
charges the debtor's duty in 
accordance with the terms on 
which the third person offered 
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it. But the debtor on learning 
of the payment or other perfor-
mance has power by disclaimer 
within a reasonable time to make 
the payment or other performance 
inoperative as a discharge. 
United American Life (the third-party) through its 
agent, Title Insurance Agency of Utah, paid $50,000 to Zions 
Bank foraReconveyance of a Trust Deed. This payment was 
made under no duty or privity to Zions First National Bank, 
in a commercially reasonable and customary manner, entitling 
United American Life and Title Insurance Agency to rely upon 
the conduct of Zions Bank. 
The bank accepted, retained and cashed the check without 
protest or question. 
The total facts and circumstances of this case show 
a proposal, an assent, consideration by Mr. Johnson and 
payment by a third-party. 
. • . The modern trend among the 
court being to uphold such 
agreements wherever possible. 
Sugarhouse Finance vs. Anderson, 
supra. 
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POINT II THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES 
ZIONS BANK FROM DENYING ITS DUTY TO RECONVEY 
THE TRUST DEED AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO SO HOLD. 
The doctrine of equitable or promissory estoppel has 
long been part of the jurisprudence of this state. In the 
early Utah case of Allen vs. Cannan, 28 P. 868 (1892), this 
court held that: 
[t]he equitable rule is that if 
one maintains silence when in 
conscience he ought to speak, 
equity will debar him from speak-
ing when in conscience he ought 
to remain silent. 
The court affirmed the doctrine and restated its 
application in the case of J.P. Hoch, Inc. vs. J.C. Penney 
Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah): 
to prevent one party from deluding 
or inducing another into a position 
where he will unjustly suffer loss. 
the test is whether there is conduct, 
by act or omission, by which one party 
knowingly leads another party, acting 
reasonably thereon, to take some 
course of action, which will result 
in his detriment or damage if the 
first party is permitted to repudiate 
or deny his conduct or representation. 
The principle has specific application in the case of 
Sugarhouse Finance Co. vs Anderson, supra: 
We note, in addition, that this 
jurisdiction recognizes the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, 
whereby an individual who has made 
a promise which the individual 
should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance is estoppel 
to deny or repudiate the promise 
should the promisee or some third 
person suffer detriment thereby. 
We note that, in the present case, 
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defendant agreed to incur additional 
indebtedness pursuant to the terms of 
the accord, in reliance on plaintiff's 
promise to accept immediate payment 
of a lesser amount in full satisfaction 
of the underlying obligation. As such, 
plaintiff should now be estopped to deny 
or reject the promise made. 
United American Life, as a third-party, did rely upon 
Zions acceptance of its funds and acquiescence in the terms 
under which the $50,000 check was delivered. 
Incidentally, the Sugarhouse case ties together the 
principles of accord and satisfaction and equitable estoppel. 
Again, it should be noted that Mr. Johnson was incurring 
additional indebtedness pursuant to the terms of the agreement 
between himself and the bank. Our facts are even stronger 
because Mr. Johnson was not seeking discharge of the obligation, 
but merely a restructuring of his loan. The bank suffers no 
detriment because, for this consideration, it was receiving a 
50% payment on a doubtful, possibly undersecured and, perhaps, 
uncollectable loan. 
It is of no excuse for the bank to contend that it did 
not know the terms of the check and voucher and is, therefore, 
not bound by it. This court, in the case of Garff Realty Co. 
vs. Better Buildings, Inc., 234 P.2d 842 (1951), adopted the 
common law view of a "duty to read". In that case, the 
court held that a party who signs or accepts a written contract 
without protest or question cannot later claim he did not read 
the contract. 
The duty to read seems especially applicable in this 
case. The Defendant's business is handling money. A bank 
should be particularly aware of the legal implications of 
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conditions written on a voucher attached to a check. This 
was acknowledged by Mr. Hintze in his testimony. The bank 
acted negligently in not reading the voucher when it endorsed, 
cashed the same, and retained the funds. This is a breach 
of its duty to read the conditions and thus, Defendant by its 
omission is charged with knowledge of the conditions of the 
check. 
Courts of other jurisdictions have applied the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in cases where there has 
been a conditional payment or a conditional delivery of a 
check. The courts have imposed two duties upon the recipient 
of the check: (1) the recipient has the duty to read the 
conditions, and (2) the recipient has a duty to speak if he 
objects to the conditions of the delivery. 
The duty of the recipient to read the conditions of 
the delivery is a fundamental common law principle. In 
a New Jersey case, Skillman vs. Titus, N.J. 
(1868), (Citation unknown), the court held that the presumptict 
of the law is that the recipient of the check has read it and, 
if he has not read the conditions, it is his own fault. This 
view is repeated in a Maine case, Hix vs. Eastern S.S. co., 
107 Me. 357 (1910), where the court held that a party cannot 
escape the presumption of having read the conditions written 
on a delivery voucher. 
Cases from other jurisdictions adhere to the principle 
that a recipient is bound by the terms stated on a check. 
In an Alabama case, McGarvin vs. Cobb, 32 s.2d 36 (1947), 
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Plaintiff tendered a check to Defendant for the purpose of 
extending Plaintiff's right to cut timber on Defendant's 
land for one year. The court held that since Defendant 
accepted and kept the check without expressing any dissent 
or alternative condition, he is bound by the conditions of 
the check. 
The Kentucky court in an earlier case, Young vs. Venters, 
18 S.W.2d (277) (1929), held the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel applies when a party accepts money paid upon 
condition, the acceptor cannot later deny the condition. 
This view is echoed in Richardson vs. Taylor, 60 A. 796 
(1905), when the Maine court held that if money is offered 
upon certain terms and conditions, and the party to whom 
the money is offered takes the money, the conditions cannot 
later be denied. 
The Maine court expanded upon its earlier holding in 
Appeal of Crockett, 154 A. 180 (1931), when it held: 
If an offer of money is made to 
one, upon certain terms and 
conditions, and the party to 
whom it is offered takes the 
money, though without words of 
assent, the acceptance is an 
assent de facto and he is bound 
by it. 
A Colorado case, Stanley-Thompson L. Co. vs Southern 
Colorado M. Co., 178 P. 577, rules very explicity on these 
points stating: 
The words "acknowledgment in 
full," when taken in connection, 
and considered, with the existing 
circumstances and all other recitals 
in the voucher and check, indicate 
that they mean the same as if the 
expression was "acknowledgment of 
payment in full of all accounts," or 
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some other phrase of like import. 
The creditor must have so understood 
the indorsement, and is presumed to 
have read it before signing its name 
beneath it and having the check 
cashed. The law charges the plaintiff 
creditor with knowledge of all the 
wording and contents of the voucher 
and check in question. Michigan 
Leather Co. v. Foyer, 104 Ill. App. 
268. The plaintiff had notice from 
the words contained in the voucher 
and check, and from the attendant 
circumstances, that the check was 
being offered in full satisfaction 
of its claim. 
The check was received, indorsed, 
and cashed, and the money obtained 
thereon was retained by the plaintiff. 
Neither the check nor the proceeds 
therefrom was ever returned or offered 
to be returned by plaintiff to defen-
dant. It must be held, therefore, that 
the check was accepted on the conditions 
on which it was offered, and that its 
acceptance constituted an accord and 
satisfaction. 
In this case, the law of this state and other juris-
dictions is firm in holding that a party has a duty to read 
the terms of a check and is charged with knowledge of those 
terms if not read. Further, having accepted the check and 
retained the proceeds and remained silent, the bank is 
estopped to deny its duty to Reconvey the Trust property 
according to the terms of the check and voucher. 
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CONCLUSION 
The loan made by Zions First National Bank to 
Franklin Johnson, his brothers and their entities was 
continuously delinquent. Unusual and unproductive 
collection efforts by the bank resulted in negotiations 
between Mr. Wayne Hintze and Mr. Franklin Johnson. Mr. 
Johnson thought he had an agreement with the bank where, 
for a payment of 50% of the principal of the loan, the bank 
would Reconvey the Trust Deed securing the Note and treat 
the balance as an unsecured loan. Mr. Hintze denied such 
agreement but the later actions of the bank estop the bank 
from denying its assent. 
The bank accepted a $50,000 check from United American 
Life, a third-person, through its agent Title Insurance 
Agency of Utah. The check was delivered in the usual and 
customary business manner between Title Insurance Agency 
and Zions First National Bank, whereby the title company 
would call the bank for a release figure on a particular 
secured loan; obtain the figures and then forward the payment 
check without immediately receiving the required and expected 
Release of Mortgage or Reconveyance. The check contained 
clear and unmistakable conditions. It was payment in full 
of the Trust Deed and the bank was instructed to return the 
check if the condition of its payment was not correct. The 
bank accepted the check, cashed the check, and retained the 
proceeds without protest. 
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All of the elements of accord and satisfaction as set 
forth by a series of leading Utah cases were satisfied. In 
fact, the Sugarhouse Finance case, supra., is a mirror image 
of the case now before the court. 
Zions First National Bank played a silent waiting game. 
The $50, 000 was accepted without comment, rejection or prates: 
and with the knowledge or expectation that its conduct would 
be relied upon by United American Life and Title Insurance 
Agency. United American Life fully intended that it would 
have a first lien on the Green River property after release 
of Zions lien by the payment of $50,000 and was never advised 
to the contrary by the bank. In fact, the bank did nothing 
on this matter until four years later when it filed a 
statutory Notice of Default. Under all of the circumstances 
of this case, the bank cannot in good conscience deny that 
this matter was settled between it and Plaintiff by an 
accord and satisfaction and the bank is estopped to deny 
its duty to Reconvey the Trust Deed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
City, Utah 
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